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ABSTRACT
It is often argued that the provision of liquidity by the international institutions such as the IMF to
countries experiencing balance of payment problems can have catalytic effects on the behavior of
international financial markets, i.e., it can reduce the scale of liquidity runs by inducing investors
to roll over their financial claims to the country. Critics point out that official lending also causes
moral hazard distortions: expecting to be bailed out by the IMF, debtor countries have weak
incentives to implement good but costly policies, thus raising the probability of a crisis. This paper
presents an analytical framework to study the trade-off between official liquidity provision and
debtor moral hazard. In our model international financial crises are caused by the interaction of bad
fundamentals, self-fulfilling runs and policies by three classes of optimizing agents: international
investors, the local government and the IMF. We show how an international financial institution
helps prevent liquidity runs via coordination of agents' expectations, by raising the number of
investors willing to lend to the country for any given level of the fundamental. We show that the
influence of such an institution is increasing in the size of its interventions and the precision of its
information: more liquidity support and better information make agents more willing to roll over
their debt and reduces the probability of a crisis. Different from the conventional view stressing
debtor moral hazard, we show that official lending may actually strengthen a government incentive
to implement desirable but costly policies. By worsening the expected return on these policies,
destructive liquidity runs may well discourage governments from undertaking them, unless they can
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In the last decade many emerging market economies have experienced currency, debt, ﬁnancial
and banking crises: Mexico, Thailand, Indonesia, Korea, Russia, Brazil, Ecuador, Turkey,
Argentina and Uruguay, to name the main ones. At diﬀerent times, each of these countries
faced massive reversal of capital ﬂows, and experienced a large drop in asset prices and economic
activity. Even if current account deﬁcits were sharply reduced via domestic policy adjustment
and painful economic contraction, external ﬁnancing gaps remained large because of strong
capital outﬂows and the unwillingness of investors to rollover short-term claims on the country
(including its government, its banks and its residents).
Crisis resolution has thus involved, in addition to domestic policy adjustment, some com-
bination of oﬃcial ﬁnancing (or ‘bailouts’) by International Financial Institutions and other
oﬃcial creditors, and private ﬁnancing in the form of ‘bailins’ of private investors (the latter is
also referred to as private sector involvement (or PSI) in crisis resolution).1 Indeed, the issue
of ‘bailouts’ versus ‘bailins’ – or private sector involvement in crisis resolution – is the most
controversial question in the debate on the reform of the international ﬁnancial architecture.2
In this debate, an important view holds that international currency and ﬁnancial crises are
primarily driven by liquidity runs and panics, and could therefore be avoided via the provision
of suﬃcient international liquidity to countries threatened by a crisis. According to this view,
the global ﬁnancial architecture should be reformed by creating an international lender of last
resort. Not only would such an institution increase eﬃciency ex-post by eliminating liquidation
costs and default in the event of a run: by severing the link between illiquidity and insolvency,
it would also prevent crises from occurring in the ﬁrst place (see Sachs (1995) and Fischer
(2001)). The opposing view doubts that international illiquidity is the main factor driving
crises. When crises can also be attributed to fundamental shocks and policy mismanagement,
1Bail-ins can take various forms in a spectrum going from very coercive to very soft forms of PSI: at one extreme are
defaults on external (and domestic) claims (as in the case of Ecuador, Argentina, Russia); somewhere between extremes
are debt suspension and standstills, semi-coercive bonded debt exchange oﬀers, semi-coercive rollover agreements (as in
the case of Ukraine, Pakistan, Uruguay Korea, Indonesia, Thailand); on the softer corner of the PSI spectrum are semi-
voluntary rollover agreements and other mild forms of PSI (Brazil in 1999, Turkey in 2001) or outright bailouts with little
PSI (Mexico in 1995, Turkey in 2002-2003).
2See Roubini (2001, 2002a, b, 2003) and Roubini and Setser (2003) for a detailed discussion of the PSI and ”bail-in
versus bail-out” debate.
1liquidity support may turn into a subsidy to insolvent countries, thus generating debtor and
creditors moral hazard (see the Meltzer Commission Report (2001)). Accordingly, IMF inter-
ventions should be limited in frequency and size so as to reduce moral hazard distortions, even
if limited support would not prevent liquidity runs.
The oﬃcial IMF/G7 position is somewhere between the two extreme views described above:
provided a crisis is closer to illiquidity than to insolvency, a partial bailout granted conditional
on policy adjustment by the debtor country can restore investors’ conﬁdence and voluntary
lending and therefore stop destructive runs — i.e., can have a “catalytic eﬀect”. If the “cat-
alytic” approach is successful, oﬃcial resources do not need to be unlimited (i.e., so large as
to ﬁll in any potential ﬁnancing gap), since some oﬃcial liquidity provision and policy adjust-
ment will convince private investors to rollover their positions (rather than run) while restoring
market access by the debtor country.3 But can partial “catalytic” bailouts be successful or, as
argued by many, can only ‘corner solutions’ of large full bailouts or full bailins prevent destruc-
tive runs? And if bailouts are not desirable because of moral hazard distortions, shouldn’t the
IMF promote alternative mechanisms that can coordinate investors’ behavior in the event of a
crisis, such as debt suspension/standstill or temporary capital controls?4
This paper contributes to the current debate on these issues by providing a theoretical
model of ﬁnancial crises and the main policy trade-oﬀs in the design of liquidity provision by an
international ﬁnancial institution. In our model, a crisis can be generated both by fundamental
shocks and by self-fulﬁlling panics, whereas liquidity provision aﬀects the optimal behavior of
the government in the debtor country (possibly generating moral hazard distortions). Our
study draws on the theoretical model by Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris and Shin (2002) and the
3See Cottarelli and Giannini (2002) and Mody and Saravia (2003) for an analysis of the IMF’s catalytic approach and
an assessment of its success.
4On these controversial questions, there is a wide range of opinions, but little analytical and formal work. The G7
doctrine and framework for PSI policy has evolved over time as a reform of the international ﬁnancial architecture was
started after the Asian and global crisis of 1997-98. The current tentative but fragile G7/IMF consensus approach can be
summarized as follows. Based on a case-by-case discretional assessment of each crisis, the IMF should ﬁnance troubled
countries with large, possibly catalytic, packages when the crisis is closer to illiquidity and country policy adjustment
can ensure solvency. The IMF should limit its ﬁnancial support, and proceed with debt restructuring/reduction when
a country is close to insolvency and unable to adopt adjustment policies. A combination of limited oﬃcial ﬁnancing,
appropriate bailins (such as debt reproﬁling, restretching or restructuring) and policy adjustment is appropriate in cases
between the two extremes — whenever problems are more severe than illiquidity but not as severe as in insolvency. Clearly,
many diﬃcult issues are left open in this framework such as those related to when large catalytic ﬁnance is appropriate.
2policy analysis by Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (2002), on the role of large speculative traders
in a currency crisis. Consistent with these contributions, we model the oﬃcial creditor (the IMF
or ILOLR) as a large player in the world economy, with a well-deﬁned objective function and
ﬁnancial resources. In our model, the strategies of the oﬃcial creditor, international speculators
and domestic governments are all endogenously determined in equilibrium.
There are two major areas in which our model contributes to the debate on the reform of
the international ﬁnancial architecture: the eﬀectiveness of catalytic ﬁnance and the trade-oﬀ
between liquidity support and moral hazard distortions. As regards the ﬁrst area, our analysis
lends support to the hypothesis that catalytic liquidity provision by an oﬃcial institution can
work to prevent a destructive run — although in our model the success of partial bailouts
is realistically limited to cases in which macroeconomic fundamentals are not too weak. In
reality, the IMF does not have inﬁnite resources and cannot close by itself the possibly very
large external ﬁnancing gaps generated by speculative runs, i.e., the IMF cannot rule out debt
defaults due to illiquidity runs. According to our results, however, even when relatively small,
contingent liquidity support lowers the likelihood of a crisis by enlarging the range of economic
fundamentals at which international investors ﬁnd it optimal to rollover their credit to the
country. This ‘catalytic eﬀect’ is stronger, the larger the size of IMF funds, and the more
accurate the IMF information. But our results also make clear that catalytic ﬁnance cannot
and will not be eﬀective when the fundamental turns out to be very weak ex post: as more
and more agents receive bad signals about the state of the economy, massive withdrawals will
cause a crisis regardless of whether the IMF intervenes.
Our result runs counter to the hypothesis, ﬁrst suggested by Krugman and King and then
formalized by Zettelmeyer (1999) and Wyplosz and Jeanne (2000), that IMF bailouts can be
eﬀective only when there are enough resources to ﬁll ﬁnancing gaps of any possible size. These
authors base their view on models with multiple equilibria, in which partial bailouts cannot
rule out the possibility of self-fulﬁlling runs, i.e., partial IMF interventions are not an eﬀective
coordination mechanism of private investors. In such a framework, liquidity support is eﬀective
only insofar as it is large enough to prevent a run and eliminate all liquidation costs in the
presence of a run.5
5Models drawing on the traditional bank run literature prescribe that the IMF should have very deep pockets. Usually,
in the analysis underlying such a view, the cost of a crisis is independent of the size of the ﬁnancial gap, i.e. the diﬀerence
3Building on the main insights from the literature on global games,6 our paper contributes
to our understanding of how and why catalytic ﬁnance can work. Liquidity support is eﬀective
both directly and indirectly. Directly, it reduces liquidation costs against speculative with-
drawal of credit as liquidity provision reduces the amount of illiquid investments that need to
be liquidated. Indirectly, it reduces the number of speculators willing to attack a country for
each realization of the economic fundamentals. In other words, the presence of the IMF means
that, over some crucial range of fundamentals, private investors are more likely to rollover their
positions than roll them oﬀ — this is the essence of ‘catalytic ﬁnance.’
Second, contrary to the widespread view linking provision of liquidity to moral hazard
distortions, we show that under some circumstances liquidity assistance can actually make a
government willing to implement eﬃciency-enhancing but costly reforms. More speciﬁcally, the
conventional view on debtor moral hazard is that, by insulating the macroeconomic outcome
from ruinous speculative runs, liquidity assistance gives the government an incentive to avoid
the costs of implementing good policies. But this is not the only possible eﬀect of an ILOLR. It
is also plausible that some governments may be discouraged from implementing good but costly
policies because speculative runs may jeopardize their success. In this scenario, by reducing
liquidation costs in the event of a run, liquidity support actually enables a government to
implement socially desirable policies, i.e., oﬃcial support motivates a country to follow good
policies. Our model can generate both scenarios — one with debtor moral hazard distortions in
case of large liquidity support, the other one with complementarity between liquidity assistance
and good policy behavior.
Our analysis is related to a vast and fast-growing literature on the merits of bailouts vs.
bailins as a crisis resolution strategy and the arguments in favor of an ILOLR (surveyed in
between short term obligations and the liquid ﬁnancial resources available to the country. In other words, by falling either
one cent or one billion dollars short of obligations, the country pays the same large cost. More general and realistic models
- such as that in our paper - would allow for partial liquidation of long term investment (selling one bit of it may provide
the required resources without incurring a macroeconomic crisis). See appendix A of this paper for further discussion.
6Speciﬁcally, our framework draws on the literature on global games as developed by Carlsson and van Damme (1993)
and Morris and Shin (2000). As is well known, in global games the state of the economy and speculative activity is not
common knowledge among agents. With asymmetric information, there will be some heterogeneity in speculative positions
even if everybody follows the same optimal strategy in equilibrium. Moreover, the precision of information need not be the
same across individuals. Arguably, global games provide a particularly attractive framework to analyze the coordination
problem in ﬁnancial markets.
4section 2 below). Our paper contributes to this literature in a number of dimensions.
First, most papers analyze an ILOLR in models after Diamond and Dybvig (1983) —
D&D henceforth — interpreting crises as a switch across instantaneous (rational-expectations)
equilibria, but ignoring or downplaying macroeconomic shocks or any other risk of fundamental
insolvency. In contrast, we develop a model where a crisis may be anywhere in the spectrum
going from pure illiquidity to insolvency. Thus, we present a more realistic speciﬁcation of an
open economy where fundamentals, in additions to speculation, can cause debt crises.7
Second, contributions drawing on D&D cannot properly address issues in moral hazard by
liquidity provisions. The reason is that, in models of multiple equilibria, the results of com-
parative static analysis depend on which equilibrium is selected, but there is no endogenous
mechanism that leads agents to select one equilibrium over the other(s). In contrast, in our
global games model the coordination mechanism is endogenous, and the equilibrium is unique.
We can therefore perform comparative statics analysis, tracing the eﬀect on government be-
havior of various assumptions about the size of the IMF, the precision of its information and
other parameters of the model. As already mentioned, the conventional wisdom is that oﬃcial
ﬁnance exacerbates the moral hazard problem: the novel result from our analysis is that, in
some circumstances, the existence of oﬃcial liquidity assistance can give a debtor country the
right incentive to implement policy adjustment.
Third, in the context of global games and the literature on the ILOLR building on them
(see Morris and Shin (2002) but also the closed-economy model by Goldstein and Pauzner
(2002) and Rochet and Vives (2002)) we model the role of oﬃcial ﬁnancial institutions as large
players whose behavior is endogenously derived in equilibrium. Much of our new analytical
insight stems exactly from this original feature of our model. In specifying the preferences of
its shareholders or principals, we model a ‘conservative’ IMF, in the sense that it seeks to lend
to illiquid countries, but not to insolvent countries. Consistently, in our equilibrium the IMF is
more likely to provide liquidity support when the crisis is caused by a liquidity run, as opposed
to crises that are closer to the case of insolvency.
Fourth, in our framework domestic expected GNP is a natural measure for national welfare
— which may diﬀer from the objective function of the domestic government because of the
(political) costs of implementing reforms and adjustment policies. We can therefore analyze
7Thus, our model is closer to fundamental banking crisis models a’ la Allen and Gale (2000) rather than D&D models.
5the impact on the welfare of domestic citizens and the government of alternative intervention
strategies by the IMF.
Fifth, the framework of global games allows us to assess the role of IMF information precision
in strengthening the IMF’s inﬂuence on private investors’ strategies and government behav-
ior. In general, a better-informed IMF reduces the aggressiveness of private speculators, and
therefore lowers the likelihood of a crisis. The role of information precision in catalytic ﬁnance,
however, becomes much more important when the IMF can strategically signal its position to
the market, e.g. it can choose to move before private investors. Some results on signalling
by CDMS and Dasgupta (1999) indeed suggest that in our economy there is an equilibrium
in which the IMF has a much stronger impact on market behavior by moving before private
investors. As in Dasgupta (1999), an IMF with suﬃciently precise information can induce
‘strong herding behavior’ — i.e., private funds’ managers disregard their private information
and make their portfolio conditional on the IMF move, rolling over their debt if the IMF makes
liquidity available to the country, withdrawing otherwise.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 below brieﬂy surveys the literature
on liquidity provision, catalytic ﬁnance and moral hazard. Section 3 introduces the model.
Sections 4, 5 and 6 present our main results, regarding the eﬀect of IMF lending on the
likelihood and severity of crises and the trade-oﬀ between IMF assistance and moral hazard
distortions. Section 7 discusses two extensions of the model, namely, seniority of IMF loans
and diﬀerent timing of IMF interventions. Section 8 concludes.
2 The international lender of last resort and “catalytic” ﬁ-
nance: an overview of issues in theory and policy
In this section, we brieﬂy discuss the debate on the creation of an international lender of last
resort (ILOLR), and the role of IMF lending as a “catalyst” for private lending at the onset
and during a crisis. This literature presents views and approaches which stress diﬀerent market
failures underlying ﬁnancial crises, and therefore emphasize diﬀerent policy trade-oﬀs faced by
governments and international institutions.
Sachs (1984) among others8 has emphasized the possibility of panic-driven runs of creditors
8Many open economy models of bank or debt runs (such as Chang and Velasco (1999) and Cole and Kehoe (1998)) are
6when the country’s liquid assets fall short of the country’s short-term liabilities (including
short-term debt, long-term debt coming to maturity, and interest payments). Models with
multiple instantaneous equilibria suggest that, provided that fundamentals are not too strong,
these runs may occur in either bad or good states of the world, and independently of the policies
implemented by the debtor country.
The literature has typically provided examples in which liquidity runs cause default because
of the implied liquidation costs. In these examples, if creditors could be convinced to rollover
debt, wasteful costs and default could be avoided altogether. But it is important to stress that
liquidity runs are costly also in bad states of the world, whereas the country would be bankrupt
independently of a run. In this case coordination failures among creditors creates additional,
avoidable costs on top of the costs due to bad shocks to fundamentals.
The possibility of coordination problems among creditors is the main argument in favor of an
international lender of last resort (ILOLR).9 To assess the strength of this argument it is useful
to understand in detail the conditions under which, facing a liquidity run, a country is unable
to obtain new loans. As there is no shortage of liquidity in international markets, it must be
that either (a) there is no private lender that is large enough to solve by itself the coordination
problem and ﬁnance a potentially solvent debtor, or (b) uncertainty and incomplete information
about the fundamentals of the country generate doubts about its solvency.
The latter point is key in any discussion of the ILOLR, as full ILOLR support is warranted
only in the presence of pure liquidity problems. The important point here is that there is
almost no historical example of pure liquidity-driven crises. Countries in ﬁnancial diﬃculties
usually have weak fundamentals and serious policy shortcomings prior to the run.10 This
evidence casts doubts on policy implications derived from models where crises are generated
international variants of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Bryant (1980) models of bank runs.
9See Sachs (1995) for an argument in favor of an ILOLR along such lines and see Fischer (2001) for reasons underlying
the creation of an ILOLR. In models after Diamond-Dybvig, self-fulﬁlling bank runs can be ruled out by the existence of
a lender of last resort providing unlimited liquidity support, or even a (government) guarantee on deposits, i.e. deposit
insurance. Jeanne (2000) argues that global welfare is increased through ILOLR intervention. Moral hazard issues are
ﬁnessed in the ILOLR model of Jeanne and Wyplosz (2001) as well as in many other analytical contributions to the
ILOLR debate.
10Empirically, illiquidity problems characterize countries also experiencing some fundamental or policy weaknesses. In
cases like Mexico, Korea, Brazil, Thailand, Indonesia and Uruguay, one can argue that the immediate cause of the crisis
was indeed a liquidity problem. Yet some serious macro, structural or policy shortcomings certainly played a role in
triggering the crisis. And in some cases (e.g. Argentina in 2001) illiquidity interacted with deeper solvency issues.
7exclusively by speculative runs (usually a variant of the Diamond and Dybvig model), since
these analyses justify an ILOLR by construction. It is preferable to build models where the
country is exposed to fundamental risk, which may cause default independently of a run, and
study the coordination problems of investors who face strategic uncertainty about both the
fundamentals and each other’s behavior.11 This is the approach we take in our paper.12
Moreover, even in cases that are close to a pure speculative run, it could be argued that the
amount of oﬃcial support need not be unlimited, i.e., need not be equal the external ﬁnancing
gap: the combination of an oﬃcial package and strong domestic policy to signal commitment to
service the country debt should restore investor’s conﬁdence and therefore the country’s access
to international ﬁnancial markets. The external ﬁnancing gap will therefore be closed by both
oﬃcial loans and new (voluntary) private capital ﬂows.
The model of catalytic ﬁnance shapes the traditional, oﬃcial view of liquidity provision by
the IMF. Yet, until very recently, there was no theoretical analysis of why and how catalytic
ﬁnance could work. The literature mostly focused on the corner solutions of full bailins or full
bailouts. This paper and Morris and Shin (2002) are, to our knowledge, the ﬁrst contributions
to ﬁll such gap in the literature (see also the closed-economy model by Rochet and Vives
(2002)).
The core policy tradeoﬀ in creating an ILOLR is between liquidity provision and moral
hazard distortions. For instance, in analyzing the IMF role in the new international ﬁnancial
architecture, many authors have stressed the need to complement provision of liquidity with
punishment mechanisms that reduce the incentive to default strategically (as in Dooley and
11In the bank run literature, there are several models of bank runs and crises driven by fundamentals. An incomplete
list includes Allen and Gale (2000), Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) and Gorton (1987).
12Note that the argument in favor of a “full bailout” by an ILOLR could also be used in support of a “full bail-in”, i.e.
some combination of broad debt standstills/suspension, capital controls and other measures to lock in all investors who are
rushing to the door. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) for instance suggest that a temporary debt suspension (bank holiday)
is the optimal policy to prevent multiple equilibria runs. The two solutions are not equivalent, however, except under
special circumstances. They have diﬀerent merits, depending on several features of the economy including the importance
of fundamental problems potentially jeopardizing solvency, the degree of uncertainty and precision of private information
about the fundamentals and the policy response to the crisis, and creditors’ risk-aversion — see for instance the discussion
in Frankel and Roubini (2001), and Roubini (2000, 2002b) arguing in favor of “bailouts” rather than debt-suspension
solution to liqudity crises and Wallace (1988) stressing optimal debt suspension policy. Debt standstill/suspensions as
alternative policies to catalytic oﬃcial ﬁnance as crisis resolution tools have not yet been analyzed in much formal detail
in the literature. A partial exception is Bank of England (2002).
8Verma (2000)) or tune down policy eﬀorts to ensure solvency (as in Kumar, Masson and Miller
(2000)). Speciﬁcally, Dooley and Verma (2000) strongly argued against reducing the costs
of renegotiating debt. To the extent that this leads an opportunistic sovereign to use debt
suspensions/standstill/defaults too often, the ﬂow of capital to emerging markets would drop
to socially ineﬃcient levels in equilibrium (see also Gai, Hayes and Shin (2001) for a reﬁnement
of the argument).
In a closed economy setup, moral hazard distortions can be reduced via incentive-compatible
deposit insurance, capital adequacy regulation and overall supervision and regulation of the
banking sector. In case ﬁnancial distress occurs, the central bank and/or the authorities in
charge of regulation and supervision have the power to seize the banks, change their man-
agement, restructure and merge them with other banks or even liquidate them. But in an
international context, there is no international authority with comparable powers: debtors
with sovereign immunity cannot be seized, merged or closed down. Moral hazard distortions
deriving from the existence of an ILOLR are thus potentially exacerbated.13
Some recent literature has contributed to our understanding of the policy trade-oﬀs be-
tween liquidity and moral hazard. Bank of England (2002) present a model that allows for
fundamentals-driven runs, and assess the arguments in favor debt standstills, relative to oﬃ-
cial ﬁnance, as crisis resolution mechanisms. These authors discuss the implications of moral
hazard but do not develop a model of the tradeoﬀ between these objectives and the optimal
13A number of recent contributions have discussed several dimensions of this issue. Kumar, Masson and Miller (2000)
focus on the maturity structure of external debt: short-term debt imposes discipline on the debtor, but only at the
cost of raising the probability of self-fulﬁlling runs. In this model, moral hazard distortions imply that full insurance by
international institutions is never optimal. Rather, liquidity lending should be made conditional on policy/eﬀort changes
that can be eﬀectively monitored by the IMF.
The accuracy of the IMF information is an important issue in assessing whether liquidity provision is appropriate or
not and whether it exacerbates moral hazard distortions. Gai, Hayes and Shin (2001) model the IMF role in reducing the
costs of disorderly adjustment following debt servicing diﬃculties in the presence of debtor moral hazard. International
liquidity support is more likely to be beneﬁcial if the IMF can make an accurate assessment of the country’s policy eﬀorts.
If the IMF is not very eﬀective in distinguishing between a crisis due to bad luck and a crisis due to opportunistic default,
lowering the ex-post cost of a crisis will raise the incentive to default strategically. In equilibrium a larger role for the
IMF can reduce social welfare because it leads to a sizeable drop in the amount of international lending. As argued by
Ghosal and Miller (2002), if oﬃcial creditors cannot detect the nature of the crisis (insolvency versus opportunistic/moral
hazard-driven default), there is a case for ”constructive ambiguity”, i.e. there should be some uncertainty about the
provision of oﬃcial liquidity support as a way to reduce moral hazard distortions. In our model, we formally analyze the
role of the relative informational advantage of an oﬃcial creditor relative to the private ones.
9intervention policy. Gale and Vives (2002) study the role of dollarization in overcoming moral
hazard distortions deriving from domestic (but not international) bailout mechanisms (such
as central bank injection of liquidity in a banking system subject to a run). Allen and Gale
(2000a) introduce moral hazard distortions in a model of fundamental bank runs, but do not
consider analytically the role of an international lender of last resort. Vives and Rochet (2002)
study domestic lending of last resort as a solution to bank runs in a global game model.14 They
ﬁnd that liquidity and solvency regulation can solve the creditor coordination problem that
leads to runs but that their cost is too high in terms of foregone returns. Thus, emergency
liquidity support is optimal in addition to such regulations. However, they do not model the
lender of last resort as a player — as we do in our paper. Therefore, they do not analyze the
tradeoﬀ between bailouts and moral hazard, and the role of a large oﬃcial creditor (IMF) that
is central to our study. The closest analysis to our model is that of Morris and Shin (2002)
who, in a parallel contribution, also consider formally catalytic IMF ﬁnance — although they
do not model the IMF as a ‘large player’.15
3 The model
Consider a small open economy with a three-period horizon — periods are denoted 0, 1 (or
interim) and 2. The economy is populated by a continuum of agents of mass 1, each endowed
with E units of resources. These agents can borrow up to D from a continuum of international
fund managers also of mass 1, willing to lend to the country only short term. Moreover, there
exists one international ﬁnancial institution, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which
may provide the country with international liquidity up to L. For simplicity, all international
lending and borrowing by domestic agents takes place at the same international interest rate
r¤, which is normalized to zero.
Domestic agents invest in domestic projects which yield a stochastic rate of return equal to
R in period 2, or to R=(1 + ·) if projects are discontinued and liquidated early in the interim
14See also Goldstein and Pauzner (2002).
15Several recent studies (Cottarelli and Giannini (2001), Mody and Saravia (2003) and Roubini and Setser (2003)) have
provided useful empirical evidence on catalytic ﬁnance. According to these studies, and consistent with the main results
of our analysis, catalytic ﬁnance is more likely to be sucessful when fundamentals are not bad and/or the amount of policy
adjustment required to achieve debt sustainability is feasible and credible.
10period. The expected return from these projects in period 2 is well above the international
interest rate, i.e., E0R > 1 + r¤ = 1. Yet, investment is illiquid, in the sense that projects can
be discontinued in period 1 at the cost · > 0 per unit of investment.16
The sequence of decisions can be summarized as follows. In period 0, agents in the economy
invest their own endowment and the borrowed resources E+D in the domestic risky technology
I and in an international liquid asset M.
In the interim period, fund managers decide whether to rollover their loans or withdraw.
Denoting with x the fraction of managers who decide to withdraw, xD measures the short-
term liquidity need of the country. To meet short-term obligations, domestic agents can use
their stock of liquid resources, and can liquidate some fraction z of the long term investment
I, getting zRI=(1 + ·). In addition, if the IMF decides to intervenes, the country can obtain
funds up to L.
Let Λ denote total international liquidity available to the country, including both the prede-
termined component M and the contingent component L. Clearly, the country will incur some
liquidation costs when xD > Λ (i.e., z will be such that xD¡Λ = zRI=(1+·)); it will default
when xD > Λ + RI=(1 + ·) (i.e., domestic agents will not be able to meet their short-term
obligations despite complete liquidation of long-term investment). When the country defaults,
we assume that all lenders will be paid pro-rata, up to exhausting the resources available to
the country.
In the last period, the country total resources consist of R(1 ¡ z)I (corresponding to GDP),
plus any money left over from the previous period, i.e., maxfΛ ¡ xD;0g. Its liabilities consists
of private debt (1 ¡ x)D plus any outstanding IMF loan L. As for the case of default in the
interim period, we assume that lenders are treated symmetrically and paid pro-rata also when
the country defaults in period 2 (the case in which IMF loans have priority over private loans
is discussed in one of the extensions of the model presented in Section 7).
16While our model analyzes speculative portfolio positions given prices, a more general model should also derive risk
premia in equilibrium. The well know diﬃculty in this step is that market prices reveal information, and therefore reduce
the importance of agents’ private signal. Interestingly, however, the empirical evidence on the IMF catalytic eﬀect on
asset prices is consistent with many of our results. For instance, Mody and Saravia (2003) ﬁnd the IMF programs improve
market access and the frequency of bond issuance, and lower spreads. IMF programs seem to contain the negative eﬀect
on spread of high export variability. Finally, the IMF inﬂuence is larger for intermediate level of the fundamentals, while
the catalytic role of the IMF increases with the size of its programs. The link between these empirical ﬁndings and our
theoretical conclusions are apparent (see Mody and Saravia (2003) for a review of the empirical literature).
11Note that the diﬀerence (if any) between total resources and debt obligations is the country
GNP, available to domestic consumption:
Y = max
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+ M ¡ D;0
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whereas we make use of the notation convention (Λ ¡ xD)+ = maxfΛ ¡ xD;0g.17 Note that
GNP and domestic consumption are zero in the event of default. In what follows, we take
GNP as a measure of national welfare.
3.1 Payoﬀs and information
In this subsection we describe the payoﬀs and information set of fund managers and the IMF.
The objective function of the government will be introduced later on, in the subsection on
moral-hazard distortions.
As in Rochet and Vives (2002), fund managers face a structure of payoﬀs that depend on
taking the “right decision”. When the country does not default, rolling over loans in period 1
is the right thing to do, and yields a beneﬁt that is higher than withdrawing — the diﬀerence
in utility between rolling over debt and withdrawing is equal to a positive constant b. When
the country defaults, managers who do not withdraw in the interim period make a mistake and
therefore pay a cost. The diﬀerence in utility between rolling over loans and withdrawing is
negative, and set equal to ¡c.
Diﬀerent from previous literature, we model an international institution providing liquidity,
the International Monetary Fund ( IMF) as an additional player that is large in the world
economy. In specifying the IMF objective function, we want to capture the idea that the IMF
is concerned with the ineﬃciency costs associated with early liquidation, but cannot provide
subsidized loans or grants to a country with bad fundamentals. The payoﬀ of the managing
17To derive the expression in the second line (1) note that the term (Λ ¡ xD)+ is zero when liquidation costs are
positive. Adding and subtracting xD we get
Y = R(1 ¡ z) + xD ¡ D ¡ L+
whereas accounting for liquidation costs we have




12board of the IMF is isomorphic to that of private fund managers: if the country ends up not
defaulting, lending L is the right thing to do. By providing liquidity rather than denying it,
the IMF gets a beneﬁt B. If the country defaults, instead, the IMF loses money when lending.
Relative to doing nothing, the beneﬁt from providing liquidity is negative and equal to ¡C.
Note that, in the above speciﬁcation of payoﬀs, the utility for funds’ managers and the IMF
is independent of the extent of default. Our analysis thus abstracts from distributional issues
between the country and the creditors, as well as between private creditors and the IMF, that
arise in debt crises.
As regards the stochastic process driving the fundamental, we assume that the rate of return
R is distributed normally with mean Rj and variance 1=½. The mean Rj — with j = A;N
— depends on the “eﬀort” of the government, as analyzed later on in the paper. In period 0,
the distribution of R (but the value of its mean) is common knowledge in the economy; R is
realized in the interim period.
In the interim period, international fund managers do not know the true R but each of them
receives a private signal e si such that
e si = R + "i (2)
whereas individual noise is normally distributed with precision ® and its cumulative distribution
function is denoted by G(:).
By the same token, the management of the IMF also ignore the true R, but receive a signal
e S such that
e S = R + ´ (3)
where ´ is also normally distributed, with precision ¯ and its cumulative distribution function
is denoted by H(:).
Now, note that the posteriors of both funds managers and the IMF will depend on public
information (the prior distribution of R), private signals and on probability assigned to the
event ‘government took action A’ (call it pA). The posterior s for a fund manager that gets
signal e si is equal to:
s = pA
µ
RA½ + e si:®
½ + ®
¶
+ (1 ¡ pA)
µ




13Analogously, the posterior of the IMF is:
S = pA
Ã
RA½ + e S:¯
½ + ¯
!
+ (1 ¡ pA)
Ã




The interaction between private and public signals in coordination games is the focus of re-
cent literature including Hellwig (2002) and Morris and Shin (2002b). Encompassing the main
results of these papers in the context of our model would complicate the analysis considerably,
without necessarily adding essential insights. To keep our work focused, we abstract from the
above issue altogether. In Sections 4 and 5 below, we will proceed as in Corsetti, Dasgupta,
Morris and Shin (2003) by assuming a very uninformative public signal (½ ! 0). In section
6, instead, we will focus on government behavior, aﬀecting the mean of the distribution of R.
Hence, we will set ½ equal to a ﬁnite value, and consider the limiting case in which private
information is arbitrarily precise, although precision is not necessarily identical for funds’ man-









S = e S (7)
so that we can disregard public information in building our equilibrium.18
3.2 Solvency and liquidity
To illustrate the logic of the model, suppose that no early withdrawal of funds could ever occur
(debt is eﬀectively long-term), so that x = 0. In this case, the country is solvent if the cash
ﬂow from investment is at least equal to its net debt19
RI ¸ D ¡ M: (8)
Thus, the minimum rate of return at which the country is solvent conditional on no liquidity





18See Hellwig (2002) (Theorem 1) among others.
19Note that the following is true whether or not the IMF lends to the country — if it does so, the country will increase
its gross stock of international safe assets in period 1, and use the additional reserves to pay back the IMF in period 2.
14In the presence of liquidity runs, a return on investment as high as Rs may no longer be
suﬃcient for the country to avoid default. Speciﬁcally, if the IMF has not lent to the country
in the interim period, the country will be solvent in period 2 if and only if:
R(1 ¡ z)I = RI ¡ (1 + ·)[xD ¡ M]+ ¸ (1 ¡ x)D: (10)
Denoting by ¯ R the minimum rate of return at which the country is solvent conditional on no
IMF intervention, we can write:




With early liquidation of investment (i.e., when xD ¡ M > 0), the break-even rate must
increase above Rs, as the failure of international investors to roll over their debt results in
wasteful liquidation costs and hence ex-post eﬃciency losses.
Conversely, if the IMF intervenes in the ﬁrst period, ex-post eﬃciency losses will be con-
tained, and the solvency threshold for the rate of return conditional on a given x will be lower.
Namely, the country will be solvent if
R(1 ¡ z)I = RI ¡ (1 + ·)[xD ¡ M ¡ L]+ ¸ (1 ¡ x)D + L: (12)
Denoting by ¯ RL the relevant threshold for default, we have
¯ RL = Rs + ·
[xD ¡ M ¡ L]+
I
¸ Rs: (13)
IMF interventions increase the country GNP to the extent that they reduce early liquidation.
It is worth noting that there are two ways in which the IMF can reduce early liquidation:
directly, as the IMF provides liquidity against fund withdrawals, and indirectly, as the presence
of the IMF may reduce the fund managers’ willingness to withdraw for any given fundamental
(lowering x for any given realization of R). This latter eﬀect is at the heart of our analysis in
the following sections.20
20Default in the interim period is also possible. For this to happen, it must be the case that the speculative attack in
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154 Speculative runs and liquidity provision in equilibrium
We now turn to the characterization of the equilibrium in our three-period economy for given
government policies (i.e., for a given distribution of the fundamental R). According to our
speciﬁcation, in the interim period the IMF and the fund managers take their decisions inde-
pendently and simultaneously. In eﬀect, we envision a world in which the contingent fund L
initially committed by the IMF may not be available ex post, and this is understood by fund
managers, who correctly compute the likelihood of IMF interventions. As mentioned above,
the idea here is that the IMF will refuse to lend if, according to its information, there is no
prospect to recover its loans L fully — so that contingent ﬁnancial assistance would turn into
a subsidy. A diﬀerent timing of decisions — with the IMF moving prior to private lenders —
is discussed in section 7.
At the heart of our model lies the coordination problem faced by fund managers in the
interim period. Fund managers are uncertain about the information reaching all other managers
and the IMF, and therefore face strategic uncertainty about their actions. But the expected
payoﬀ of each fund manager from rolling over a loan to the country depends positively on the
fraction (1 ¡ x) of managers not withdrawing in the interim period, as well as on the IMF
willingness to provide liquidity. The IMF expected payoﬀ from providing liquidity, in turn,
depends positively on the fraction of agents who roll over their debt. Clearly, the decision by
the fund managers and the IMF are strategic complements.
As in Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris and Shin [2003] — hereafter CDMS — in our model
there is a unique equilibrium21 in which agents employ trigger strategies: a fund manager
will withdraw in period 1 if and only if her private signal on the rate of return of the risky
investment is below some critical value e s¤, identical for all managers. Analogously, the IMF
will intervene in support of a country in distress if and only if its own private signal is above
The minimum rate of return at which early liquidation x leads to early default is














where ED stands for early (period 1) default.
21The equilibrium is familiar to readers of the global-game literature. It is a Bayes Nash equilibrium in which, conditional
on a player signal, the action prescribed by this player’s strategy maximize his conditional expected payoﬀ when all other
players follow their equilibrium strategy.
16some critical value e S¤. Using the argument in CDMS , it can be shown that a focus on trigger
strategies is without loss of generality, as there is no other equilibrium in other strategies. The
proof is omitted, since it can be derived from the appendix A of the CDMS paper.
The equilibrium is characterized by four critical thresholds. The ﬁrst two thresholds are
critical values for the fundamental R, below which the country always defaults — one condi-
tional on no IMF intervention, ¯ R, the other conditional on IMF intervention, ¯ RL. The other
two are the thresholds e s¤ and e S¤ for the private signal reaching the funds managers and the
IMF, discussed above. In this and the next section we will assume that the public signal is
arbitrarily uninformative — i.e., ½ ! 0, so that posteriors will coincide with private signals
(see (6) and (7)). We will therefore express signals and thresholds of individual managers and
the IMF in terms of these agents’ posterior, denoted without tilde (i.e., si, S, s¤ and S¤).
Let us ﬁrst derive the equations determining ¯ R and ¯ RL. If funds managers follow a trigger
strategy with threshold s¤, the proportion of fund managers who receive a signal such that
their posterior is below s¤ and hence withdraw in the ﬁrst period crucially depends on the
realization R:
x = prob(si · s¤ j R) ´ G(s¤ ¡ R): (14)
Using our deﬁnition of the threshold for failure ¯ R, if the IMF does not intervene, there will be
a crisis for any R such that R · ¯ R. Then, at R = ¯ R the mass of international managers that
withdraw is just enough for causing the country to fail. This mass is x = G(s¤ ¡ ¯ R). Using
(11), the ﬁrst equilibrium condition — deﬁning ¯ R — is therefore:









If the IMF intervenes, there will be a crisis for any R such that R · ¯ RL. As above, at
¯ RL the critical mass of speculator to cause debt liquidity-related problems is x = G(s¤ ¡ ¯ RL).
From (13), the threshold for failure conditional on IMF intervention ¯ RL is:









This is the second equilibrium condition — deﬁning ¯ RL. At the thresholds ¯ R and ¯ RL, xD must
be greater than M conditional on no IMF intervention, and greater than M +L otherwise. So,
17in equilibrium
£




G(s¤ ¡ ¯ RL) ¢ D ¡ M ¡ L
¤
> 0:
It is easy to show the two equilibrium conditions above imply ¯ RL < ¯ R. 22
We now turn to the equations determining the triggers s¤ and S¤, starting from the latter.
Upon receiving the signal e S, the IMF assigns probability H( ¯ RL¡S) to the failure of the country
despite its intervention. The IMF expected payoﬀ (denoted WIMF) is therefore
WIMF = B ¢
¡
1 ¡ H( ¯ RL ¡ S)
¢
¡ C ¢ H( ¯ RL ¡ S)
which is decreasing in S. The optimal strategy consists of lending to the country if and only if
this expected payoﬀ is non-negative, that is, if and only if S ¸ S¤ where S¤ is deﬁned by






The investor’s problem is more complex, as discussed in CDMS. Whether or not the IMF
intervenes, the country will default for R < ¯ RL. So, a fund manager receiving signal e s will
assign probability G( ¯ RL¡s) to the event ‘default regardless of the IMF’s action’. However, for
R comprised between ¯ RL and ¯ R, the country will default only if the IMF fails to intervene. So,
the managers’ expected payoﬀ (denoted WFM) from rolling over their fund in period 1 includes
a term accounting for the conditional probability that the IMF fails to provide liquidity to the





G( ¯ RL ¡ s) +
Z ¯ R
¯ RL





G( ¯ RL ¡ s) +
Z ¯ R
¯ RL
g(R ¡ s) ¢ H(S¤ ¡ R)dR
!
22From (15) and (16) we have:
















































Suppose ¯ R · ¯ RL. Then the LHS of the above equation would be less or equal to zero, while the RHS is positive. So it
must be the case that ¯ R > ¯ RL.
18where g is the probability density function. The optimal trigger s¤ for funds’ managers is
implicitly deﬁned by the zero-proﬁt condition (in expected terms) below:
b
b + c
= G( ¯ RL ¡ s¤) +
Z ¯ R
¯ RL
g(R ¡ s¤) ¢ H(S¤ ¡ R)dR: (19)
The appendix A2 shows that there is a unique value s¤ that solves this equation.
The four equations (15), (16), (17) and (19) in four endogenous variables ( ¯ R, ¯ RL, S¤ and s¤)
completely characterize the equilibrium. Note that in our equilibrium the country will always
default when the realization of the fundamentals is worse than ¯ RL, it will never default when
R is above ¯ R (when R ¸ ¯ R, whether or not the IMF intervenes, the fundamentals are good
enough for the country to withstand any speculative run in the interim period). But for R
comprised between ¯ R and ¯ RL, default may or may not occur, depending on the IMF. Analytical
solutions for the general case are not available, but after identifying the relevant questions we
want to address, we can resort to numerical simulations and derive some analytical results.
5 The eﬀect of IMF lending on the likelihood and severity of
debt crises
A distinctive feature of our global-game model is that crises have both a fundamental com-
ponent and a speculative component. Not only must the rate of return be low enough for a
speculative withdrawal to cause a solvency crises: withdrawals are more likely when the fun-
damentals are weak. The presence of an institutional lender of liquidity – even if with limited
resources – aﬀects the strategy of the fund managers. By changing the likelihood of specula-
tive withdrawals, its presence can therefore inﬂuence the macroeconomic performance of the
country.
In this section, we analyze the eﬀects of IMF lending on the likelihood and severity of
debt crises. More speciﬁcally, we can articulate our analysis addressing the following four
questions:23
1. Does a larger availability of resources to the IMF increase the ‘conﬁdence’ of the fund
23CDMS analyze questions related to the ﬁrst three in our list in the context of a study focused on the role of large
speculative players in currency crises.
19managers in the country — as captured by their willingness to roll over their loans for a
relatively worse signal on the state of fundamentals?
2. To what extent does IMF lending aﬀect the likelihood of a crisis?
3. Does the precision of the information of the IMF relative to the market matter? In other
words, is the impact of IMF lending stronger as its information becomes more accurate?
4. To what extent IMF lending creates moral hazard, in the sense that because of liquidity
support governments and/or corporations do not take (costly) steps to reduce vulnerabil-
ity to crises?
We discuss the ﬁrst three questions in this section. The last question on moral hazard —
where our work yields the most novel result — will be analyzed in detail in the next section.
Throughout our analysis, we will constrain L such that L < D ¡ M. Obviously, when L
becomes large enough to cover all possible withdrawals, liquidity is no more a concern — the
break even rate is Rs.
5.1 Size of interventions
As regards question 1 and 2 above, we summarize our comparative static exercise by means of
the following proposition:
Proposition 1 All thresholds ( ¯ RL, ¯ R, s¤ and S¤) are decreasing in L.
Proof: see appendix.
To see how this proposition answers to question 1, note that if a larger L lower s¤, funds
managers are now willing to rollover their loans for weaker private signals about fundamentals
— hence they are less aggressive in their trading. A larger IMF raises the proportion of
investors who are willing to roll over their debt at any level of the fundamental. Moreover,
since the rate of return is normally distributed, if ¯ R, ¯ RL and S¤ are all decreasing in L, the
ex-ante probability of a crisis also falls with L. Then, the answer to question 2 is that bigger
IMF interventions indeed lower the likelihood of a crisis. Observe that a lower S¤ increases
the probability of the IMF intervention for each level of the fundamentals. Expected GNP
correspondingly increases.
20These results lend theoretical support to the notion that an international lender of last resort
increases the country’s expected GNP not only through the direct eﬀects of liquidity provision
(interventions obviously reduce costly liquidation of existing capital). There is also an indirect
eﬀect on the coordination problem faced by fund managers: the possibility of interventions
of size L lowers the threshold at which private managers refuse to roll over their debt, to an
extent that increases with the size of contingent interventions. It follows that an international
lender can avoid some early liquidation even if it does not act ex post.
To enhance the comparison between our analysis and the literature (especially contributions
stressing multiple equilibria and self-fulﬁlling runs), it is useful to look at the equilibrium in our
model when the precision of signals becomes arbitrarily large. When the errors "i go to zero,
all private signals are arbitrarily close to the true fundamental R. Yet, signals are not common
knowledge and agents still face strategic uncertainty about each other actions (i.e., they do not
‘know’ each other action in equilibrium). But with ®;¯ ! 1, except in a measure-0 set in
which the fundamental happens to be arbitrarily close to the threshold ¯ RL, either everybody
withdraws early and the IMF does not intervene or nobody withdraws early. In this limiting
case, there is no heterogeneity in managers’ action, and there will be (almost) no provision
of liquidity in equilibrium. Thus, the prediction of our model is observationally equivalent to
the model with common knowledge after Diamond and Dybvig [1983] — for a comparison,
Appendix A.1 develops a D&D version of our model.
With ®;¯ ! 1, all the beneﬁt of a lender of last resort come through the coordination
eﬀect (as the IMF almost never intervenes saving liquidation costs). To coordinate markets,
however, the IMF need not have ‘deep pockets’. A marginal increase in the size of condi-
tional interventions L lowers the threshold s¤ chosen by all agents in equilibrium (at which x
endogenously drops from 1 to 0).
5.2 The precision of IMF information
Above we have characterized the equilibrium when private signals become arbitrarily precise.
Question 3 raises the interesting issue regarding the role, if any, of the relative precision of the
information of the IMF. This is a central issue in the analysis of the inﬂuence of large players in
currency crises by CDMS, as these players are usually believed to act on superior information.
21In our context, the main interest is in the equilibrium eﬀect of improving the quality of IMF
information.
What happens when the IMF private information becomes more accurate? The following
proposition synthesize our result.
Proposition 2 An increase in the IMF information precision decreases all thresholds.
Proof: see appendix24
Ceteris paribus, a higher precision of information by the IMF increases the willingness by
fund managers to roll-over their loans to the country, and reduces the probability of default.
Intuitively, if the IMF has the ability to estimate the state of the country fundamentals arbi-
trarily well, funds’ managers need not worry about idiosyncratic noise in the IMF intervention
decisions. Provided that the IMF’s objective function is common knowledge, private investors
understand its strategy (lending to possibly illiquid but not to insolvent countries). At the
margin, increasing the accuracy of IMF information makes them more willing to lend, because
they will be conﬁdent that the IMF assessment of the fundamentals will not be far away from
their own assessment — they can therefore expect the IMF to intervene when they believe that
the state of the economy grant intervention.
5.3 A remark on portfolio managers’ incentives
In our model, the strategies of all agents are endogenous in equilibrium. The parameters
describing investors’ payoﬀs aﬀect more than the fund managers’ own investment thresholds:
because of their inﬂuence on the market coordination problem, these parameters also aﬀect the
equilibrium strategy by the IMF.
In our analysis, we focus on IMF’s incentives and strategy. Yet our framework can also shed
light on the general equilibrium eﬀect of corporate governance and managers’ behavior. By way
of example, the next proposition establishes a link between the structure of incentives faced
by the funds’ managers, and the likelihood of IMF interventions. Recall that in our model b
is the net gain in utility when a manager rolls over debt and the country is solvent, relative
24CDMS show an analogous result for the limiting case when all players have arbitrarily accurate information. Our
proposition generalize their result.
22to withdrawing in the ﬁrst period. The same net utility is negative and equal to ¡c when the
country defaults. Formally:
Proposition 3 All thresholds ( ¯ RL, ¯ R, s¤ and S¤) are decreasing in b and increasing in c.
Proof: see appendix.
Intuitively, a weaker reward to successful long-term investment makes fund managers more
wary about rolling over their credit. This in turn leads the IMF to be more cautious in providing
liquidity. The likelihood of debt default correspondingly increases in equilibrium.
This proposition touches upon a topic extensively discussed by the literature, regarding the
reason why rewards to long-term investment strategies may be perceived as weak by managers.
For instance, funds’ performance may be assessed against industry-wide benchmarks, so that
individual managers may be reluctant to take positions at odds with those benchmarks, even if
these position may have good risk-adjusted payoﬀs in the long term. Although our example is
admittedly stylized, it shows the potential importance of general equilibrium analysis of these
issues.
6 Liquidity and moral hazard
In the previous section we have shown that the ex-ante GNP of the country — our measure
of national welfare — is increasing in the size of the IMF for any given distribution of the
fundamental. Yet, moral-hazard considerations may invalidate such conclusion, since liquidity
assistance by the IMF could reduce the incentive for the government to implement costly
policies that enhance the likelihood of good macroeconomic outcomes.
We now develop our framework and assume that the government can take a costly action
improving the expected value of R without aﬀecting the variance of the distribution. The
government decides its level of eﬀort in period 0, when international investors lend D to the
country and the IMF states the size of its contingent intervention L. The action by the
government is not observed at any point (and the IMF cannot make the provision of liquidity
conditional on it).
For simplicity, we will initially assume that the government can take one single action A (say,
a policy reform and ﬁscal adjustment) that raises E0R from RN to RA (let ∆R = RA ¡ RN).
23The welfare cost of undertaking action A is Ψ. This cost falls on the government only, and is
motivated by exogenous considerations, say, electoral costs of reforms and ﬁscal adjustment.
The government welfare function is
W = U ¡ Ψ = E0Y ¡ Ψ (20)
where U is the utility of the domestic representative agent. Note that W does not coincide
with social welfare U, that is measured by expected GNP only. At this end of this section, we
will show that our main results carry over to a more general setup.
6.1 Liquidity provision and government behavior
It is convenient to focus our analysis on the limiting case when private signals become arbi-
trarily precise. An important reason is that, as the government aﬀects the mean of the prior
distribution, we need to relax the assumption of an uninformative public signal and conduct
our analysis by setting a strictly positive ½. With arbitrarily precise private information, we
can do so without unnecessarily complicating the analysis. A second reason is that, as we have
shown in the previous section, the case of arbitrarily precise private information brings the re-
sults of our model more closely into line with the predictions of models after Diamond-Dybvig,
and therefore makes it easier to stress core diﬀerences between the two. Namely, with ® ! 1,
all agents will take the same action in equilibrium for almost all realizations of R (except when
R happens to be arbitrarily close to ¯ RL), so that in equilibrium there will be no heterogeneity
(but the equilibrium is unique) and no partial liquidation (except in a measure-zero set). Thus,
the utility of the government conditional on its action simpliﬁes to:
lim
®!1 W (A) =
Z 1
¯ RL
[R ¢ I + M ¡ D] f (R j RA) dR ¡ Ψ (21)
lim
®!1 W (N) =
Z 1
¯ RL
[R ¢ I + M ¡ D] f (R j RN) dR
Notably, the integrand in the above expressions does not depend on the liquidation cost · —
the set of realizations of R at which funds’ withdrawals in period 1 lead to partial liquidation
has measure zero. But the above expression is not independent of ·: in fact the lower extreme
of integration (i.e., the threshold ¯ RL) crucially depends on this cost.
24Taking the diﬀerence in government welfare with and without the costly action we obtain:
lim
®!1 W (A) ¡ W (N) ´ ∆W = I ¢ ∆R ¢
¡
1 ¡ F






[R ¢ I + M ¡ D] ¢ f (R j RA) dR ¡ Ψ
In deciding whether to undertake the action A, the government compares the utility costs
of a reform Ψ with the gains in expected GNP that come both in terms of higher average
realization of R (ﬁrst term on the RHS), and in terms of lower expected liquidation costs
(second term on the RHS) because of the drop in the probability of a run on debt.
As the size of the IMF impacts the limits of integration, depending on parameter values
there may be some critical L at which the government switches policy. The question is therefore
how the net gain from the action A, ∆W, vary with the size of the IMF, L. The answer is
stated by the following proposition.
Proposition 4 ∆W is decreasing in L if and only if ¯ RL < RA+RN
2 .
Proof: using our proposition (1), we know that for a given distribution of the fundamental,
¯ RL is decreasing in L. We can therefore study the response of ∆W to changes in ¯ RL, rather
than in L. We have:
d(∆W)
d ¯ RL
= ( ¯ RLI + M ¡ D)
£
f
¡ ¯ RL j RN
¢
¡ f
¡ ¯ RL j RA
¢¤
(23)
The ﬁrst term in brackets is non-negative (because ( ¯ RLI+M ¡D) = ( ¯ RL¡Rs)I and ¯ RL ¸ Rs)
but the second term can have either sign. As RA > RN, we have that
f
¡ ¯ RL j RN
¢
> f
¡ ¯ RL j RA
¢




which is the condition for a positive
d(∆W)
d ¯ RL . ¤
Suppose that ¯ RL is lower than both RN and RA — implying that the probability of a crisis
is less than 50 percent irrespective of government behavior. In this case, the diﬀerence on the
RHS is positive: a decrease in ¯ RL, corresponding to a more abundant liquidity provision L,
reduces the extra-utility a government gets for taking the costly action A.
This case is illustrated by Figure 1-a.25 In equilibrium, the position of ¯ RL in this ﬁgure is
25Parameters employed: RA = 1:25, RN = 1:20, ¾R = 0:08 and ¯ RL = 1:15.
25such that the density at ¯ RL is higher conditional on RN than conditional on RA. A decrease
in ¯ RL will therefore reduce the gain in expected GNP from ‘good’ government behavior.











































Figure 1: Government’s decision: ∆W and ¯ RL
The equilibrium in Figure 1-a is consistent with the commonly held view of moral hazard
distortions from liquidity provision. The argument underlying the traditional view is that the
cost Ψ is high while the chances of a favorable macroeconomic outcome are good despite no
government eﬀort. In this case, additional liquidity provision is more likely to be helpful if
the government does not take the costly action, so it further reduces the incentive for good
behavior. However, our proposition make it clear that what is drawn in ﬁgure 1-a is not the
only possible scenario.
266.2 Liquidity provision as an incentive for the government to ‘do the right
thing’
We are now ready to state a key result of our analysis. Suppose that the country fundamentals
are relatively weak, in the sense that the ex-ante probability of a crisis is more than 50 percent
even if the government chooses the costly action A. Then, according to proposition 4, ∆W will
be increasing in L.
Intuitively, if — at some given L — the probability of a failure is relatively high, the
government has little incentive to bear the costs of improving the macro outcome: the chance
that a good outcome will materialize is low whether or not it exerts any eﬀort. In this case,
additional liquidity provision is more likely to be helpful if the government takes the costly
action, so it increases the incentives for good behavior. By reducing the likelihood of runs and
their costs in terms of forgone output, larger support by an international lender of last resort
improves the trade oﬀ between the cost of government eﬀort and the related improvement in
the country’s GNP. Whether the government chooses the action A in equilibrium will then
depend on whether the net utility gain from action A exceeds its cost. To illustrate this case,
in Figure 1-b the equilibrium ¯ RL is drawn to the right of RA. Clearly, a decrease in ¯ RL raises
the gains in expected GNP from the government action A.
Figure 1-c, instead, shows how the derivative of ∆W with respect to ¯ RL varies with the
level ¯ RL.26 In looking at this ﬁgure, recall that ¯ RL is monotonically decreasing in the size
of IMF intervention L — so what the graph shows is the marginal eﬀect of L on government
incentives at diﬀerent level of liquidity assistance. If ¯ RL is small (i.e., L is large), the diﬀerence
£
f
¡ ¯ RL j RN
¢
¡ f
¡ ¯ RL j RA
¢¤
is positive and so is
d(∆W)
d ¯ RL . For intermediate values of ¯ RL (and
L ), the ex-ante probability of a crisis gets higher. When ¯ RL is large enough, f








d ¯ RL is negative. In this case, by lowering ¯ RL, additional liquidity provision
(larger L) actually strengthens the incentive for the government to take the costly action.
Relative to the traditional view, global-game models point to a diﬀerent and intriguing
possibility, one of strategic complementarity between the actions by the IMF and the domestic
government (see the discussion of a similar result in Morris and Shin (2002)). When the ex-
ante probability of a crisis is high, the payoﬀ to the government from action A is increasing
26Parameters employed: RA = 1:25, RN = 1:20, ¾R = 0:08, I = 1, M = 0:2, D = 1:2.
27in L. Note that also the payoﬀs of the IMF is increasing in the action A undertaken by the
government.
In closing this section, we note that our conclusion remains unchanged when government
welfare depends on GDP, rather than GNP — this is equivalent to assume that the amount
paid to foreigners is independent of the realization of R, perhaps because there are other
resources in the economy in addition to the payoﬀs of domestic investment I. By discussing
this case, we stress that our results are not driven by the assumption of “limited liability”
for the economy as a whole. Even if the government cares about GDP, a marginal increase
in the size of the IMF would still reduce ¯ RL, producing marginal saving on liquidation costs.
Its eﬀect on the incentives to take the costly action A depends on the likelihood that it will
beneﬁt the government in either situation (conditional on choosing RA or RN). The intuition
is exactly the same as when government cares about GNP — we present some calculation in
the appendix A.7 to shed further light on this issue.
6.3 Policy tradeoﬀs and the optimal size of L: numerical examples
The properties of our model can be illustrated by means of four numerical examples, all depicted
in Figure 2. To draw this ﬁgure, we adopt the parameter values shown in table 1, and set
D = 1:2 and I = 1. For each example, we plot W (A), W (N) and W (A)+Ψ against diﬀerent
values of L.
As shown above, the government chooses the costly action whenever W (A) > W (N). The
country’s GNP is therefore W (N) if the action is not taken, and W (A) + Ψ if the action is
taken. Thus, the various graphs in ﬁgure 2 show for which values of L the government takes
the costly action A; as well as the country expected GNP, as a function of L.
Figures 2-a and 2-b illustrate the case in which a large ILOLR unambiguously creates
moral hazard distortions. Comparing W (A) with W (N): the former exceeds the latter — i.e.,
governments prefer to take the costly action — only for relatively low values of L, between 0
and (approximately) 0.20. Liquidity provision in excess of this value creates a clear incentive
for the government not to act. To trace the behavior of expected GNP for diﬀerent levels of L,
compare W (A)+Ψ with W (N). Increasing the size of the IMF contingent interventions above
0 at ﬁrst raises expected GNP monotonically along W (A)+Ψ. At L around 0.20, however, the
28Table 1: Value of the parameters in ﬁgure 2
ﬁgure 2-a 2-b 2-c 2-d
· .3 .25 .25 .25
M .25 .20 .20 .20
Ψ .06 .05 .045 .05
b 2 1 1 1
c 10 10 10 10
B 2 2 2 2
C 10 10 10 10
RA 1.18 1.25 1.18 1.12
RN 1.16 1.22 1.15 1.065
¾R .03 .05 .05 .05
moral hazard distortion kicks in, determining a discrete drop in expected GNP and national
welfare to W (N). Conditional on RN, providing more liquidity assistance has again a positive
eﬀect on expected GNP.
Thus, in a global sense, there could be diﬀerent trade-oﬀs between liquidity provision and
moral hazard. In Figure 2-b, the country GNP is at a maximum when liquidity provision is
just below the level at which the government would give up the costly action A. Globally,
moral hazard distortions are more important than the costs of liquidity crises. Conversely, in
Figure 2-a, the country GNP is highest for high values of L despite moral hazard distortions.
Liquidity costs in this case are more important than the output costs due to moral hazard.
Figure 2-c illustrates the possibility of strategic complementarity between IMF lending and
government policies towards solvency. In this ﬁgure the tradeoﬀ between liquidity and moral
hazard vary with L. For suﬃciently low values of L, W (A) < W (N) and the government does
not undertake any action because it is discouraged by bleak prospects of success. For interme-
diate level of liquidity support, however, the government welfare becomes higher conditional
on undertaking the action A. Liquidity provision eventually becomes excessive. For levels of
L in excess of 0.4, once again W (A) < W (N): the government does not exert any eﬀort,
and the country’s expected GNP falls. Note that, relative to Figure 2-b, the only parameter
change consists of decreasing both RA and RN by a few percentage points — enough to worsen








































































Figure 2: Policy tradeoﬀs
the macroeconomic outcome in such a way that, within some range of the fundamental, the
government would not undertake any costly policy without liquidity assistance by the IMF.
Relative to Figure 2-c, in Figure 2-d we further reduce both RA and RN, while allowing
for a larger diﬀerence ∆R. In ﬁgure 2-d, government welfare conditional on the costly action
is actually higher than W(N) if the IMF provides suﬃciently large contingent funds. The
country GNP is always higher conditional on A: globally, there is no trade oﬀ between liquidity
provision and moral hazard.
These considerations may be useful as building blocks towards a normative study of the
optimal size of IMF interventions. As apparent from ﬁgure 2, local governments like the
highest possible level of liquidity assistance by the IMF. Once moral hazard considerations are
30taken into account, however, the level of liquidity assistance preferred by policymakers may
not be the one that maximizes expected GNP and national welfare. Since the welfare cost Ψ
does not fall on the country’s citizens, these may prefer a low level to a large level of L. This
is the case in the economy depicted by Figure 2-b.
The level of L preferred by the IMF need not coincide with either the level of L preferred
by national governments, or the level preferred by the country’s citizens. In our speciﬁcation,
the structure of IMF preferences penalizes any loss of funds in case of national default, yet as a
simpliﬁcation the penalty from lending liquidity to crisis countries is exogenously given. Thus,
for any given disutility from loosing its loans to the country — the main concern of the IMF is
whether or not to limit L below its feasible level, as a way to mitigate moral-hazard distortions
that could raise discretely the likelihood of a crisis.
6.4 Moral hazard with a continuous set of actions for the government
We conclude this section by reconsidering our analysis of moral hazard in a more general
framework. Let ∆R denote policy eﬀort, raising linearly the expected value of the fundamental,
i.e., E0R = R0 + ∆R. Policy eﬀort entails a utility cost Ψ(∆R)
º =º, aﬀecting the government
only. Thus, assuming that the noise in private signal is arbitrarily small (® ! 1), the policy


















Taking the derivative with respect to ∆R, we get:
dW (∆R)
d∆R
= ( ¯ RLI + M ¡ D)f





I ¢ f (R j R0)dR ¡ Ψ(∆R)
º¡1 (26)
= ( ¯ RL ¡ Rs)If








It is easy to show that, for º > 1 and reasonable values of Ψ, our results for the binary-
action case still apply. Namely, when ex-ante odds of a crisis are high enough, the government
chooses little or no policy eﬀort. By reducing the ex-ante probability of a crisis, a larger L
would then raise the government incentive to choose a higher eﬀort ∆R. Conversely, when the
ex-ante probability of a run is small, additional liquidity provision induces the government to
reduce ∆R.








































































Figure 3: Continuous set of actions for the government
These results are illustrated by Figures 3-a,b,c, which plot the optimal eﬀort level ∆R as a
function of ¯ RL, for º equal to 2, 1:2 and 3, respectively. Figure 3-d, instead, shows the ex-ante
odds of a crisis as a function of ¯ RL conditional on ∆R = 0.27 The ﬁrst three graphs appear
quite similar: eﬀort (∆R) is increasing in ¯ RL up to a point (around 1:18 or 1:20, depending
on parameters’ values), after which it is decreasing in ¯ RL. Note that the elasticity of ∆R falls
with º.
27Parameters used in the ﬁgures: Rs = 1, R0 = 1:15, ¾R = 0:05, I = 1.
327 Extensions of the model
7.1 Seniority of IMF loans
The IMF may require a ‘preferred creditor status’ as a precondition to provide liquidity. A
realistic variant of our model could then allow IMF loans to have priority over private loans.
In this case, the solvency threshold for the return on the risky investment that is relevant for
the IMF decision is
R(1 ¡ z)I = RI ¡ (1 + ·)[xD ¡ M ¡ L]+ ¸ L (27)
Provided that [xD ¡ M ¡ L] > 0 we can write
















The international liquidity provider keeps lending up the point in which the country has just
enough resources to repay L.
There are two eﬀects to consider. On the one hand, as the IMF gets a larger share of the
country’s resources in case of default, it is more willing to intervene. This eﬀect makes a crisis
less likely. On the other hand, conditional on a crisis, private investors are juniors relative to
the IMF, so that the return on their investment is lower. They should therefore be less willing
to roll over debt. This eﬀect makes a crisis more likely.
What are the overall implications of allowing for IMF seniority? We will show below that our
framework fully captures the ﬁrst eﬀect, while providing a framework for a heuristic discussion
of the second. Assuming, as in section 4, that ½ ! 0, the following equations characterize the
equilibrium when the IMF loans have seniority) — all variables in this case are denoted with
a prime ( 0 ):
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g(R ¡ s0¤) ¢ H(S0¤ ¡ R)dR (33)
There are now 5 equations and 5 variables, instead of 4 equations in 4 variables. Note that the
derivatives of the above expressions with respect to L are all negative, and, as in the version
of our model without IMF seniority, ¯ R0
L < ¯ R0. We can show that:
¯ R0
IMF < ¯ R0
L (34)
We hereafter state our result:
Proposition 5 When the IMF has seniority, there is a positive coordination eﬀect that reduces
all thresholds making the crisis less likely (ex-ante): s¤0 < s¤, ¯ R0 < ¯ R, ¯ R0
L < ¯ RL.
Proof: see appendix.
This proposition conﬁrms our previous result, that more liquidity provision (induced by
IMF seniority) tends to increase the willingness of fund managers to roll over their debt, and
decrease the likelihood of crises. But note that the proposition holds agents’ payoﬀs constant
— i.e., the penalty for lending to a defaulting country does not change even if the private
return conditional on default are now lower. Realistically this penalty should become higher
when the IMF debt has seniority. From proposition 2 we know that an increase in the penalty
parameter c will tend to raise all thresholds — i.e., move them in the opposite direction relative
to what predicted by proposition (5). An important extension of the model thus consists of
specifying a tighter link between managers’ payoﬀs and portfolio returns, as to disentangle the
role of other factors, such as risk aversion, in determining optimal intervention policies.
7.2 Sequential moves
An important question in our study concerns the consequences of letting the IMF move before
the withdrawal decision by funds managers. In this section we brieﬂy discuss the case in which
funds managers take their portfolio decision being informed about the IMF intervention. A
similar question is addressed by CDMS and especially by Amil Dasgupta in a series of papers
— to which we refer for the analytical aspects of the issue.
34Consider the following amendment of our setup: private signals reach the IMF and funds’
managers simultaneously, but the interim period is split into two subperiods: early and late.
The payoﬀ structure is the same as before: in particular, payoﬀs do not depend on moving
early or late in the interim period.
CDMS start their analysis with an observation about timing incentives in the new game
— an observation that also applies here. Under the assumption that payoﬀs are independent
of the timing of the move, individual funds managers with no market power will always have
an incentive to move late rather than early. They know that they will have no beneﬁt from
signalling: as they are too small to inﬂuence the actions by other players, there is no point
in taking an early position in the market. On the other hand, they can learn something by
waiting: they can learn whether the IMF has committed liquidity funds L, which also conveys
information about the IMF private signal.
The same argument implies that the IMF will always have a weak incentive to move ﬁrst.
As funds managers always wait, the IMF will never learn anything by waiting — no private
decision will be taken early in the interim period. On the other hand, by moving early, the
IMF can inﬂuence the behavior of the market. There is a clear beneﬁt from moving ﬁrst. As
in CDMS, the IMF is assumed to move early.
CDMS and related work by Dasgupta show that this game admits an equilibrium in trigger
strategies similar to the one analyzed in Section 4, except that now funds managers have
two triggers for their signal: one conditional on IMF intervention, the conditional on no IMF
intervention. Notably, as before, the IMF intervenes if and only if its signal is good enough
relative to an optimally selected thresholds for its signal. But this means that, by observing the
IMF move, funds managers will learn whether the signal reaching the IMF is above or below
such a threshold. If the precision of IMF information is high enough, the IMF move will be
quite informative about the state of the fundamentals. One can build examples in which funds
managers will disregards their private signal, and just conform to the IMF move: they will
rollover debt if the IMF opens contingent credit lines to the country, and withdraw otherwise.
This is dubbed “strong herding behavior” in Dasgupta (1999). If however the IMF precision of
information is not high, funds managers will form their posterior without ignoring their private
information. An IMF intervention will of course discourage some of the withdrawals, without
35necessarily eliminating the possibility of a speculative crisis.28
8 Conclusions
As the main results of the model have been stated in the introduction, we devote our conclusion
to some policy-related consideration, and a brief discussion of perspectives for future research.
The debate on reforming the international ﬁnancial architecture has long suﬀered from the
lack of analytical studies comparing liquidity support (bailouts) with diﬀerent forms of private
sector involvement. The merit of policy analyses embracing the extreme paradigm of multiple
instantaneous equilibria and self-fulﬁlling crises consists in stressing that disruptive speculative
runs need not be inconsistent with rational individual behavior — i.e., rational expectations
are not suﬃcient to rule out speculative threats to macroeconomic and ﬁnancial stability.
Self-fulﬁlling runs, however, are not the exclusive cause of crises, so that excessive emphasis on
liquidity may severely bias policy design. Moreover, these analyses have severe limits in dealing
with a number of important policy issues, especially regarding the trade-oﬀ between liquidity
provision and moral hazard, but also as regards transparency and information accuracy.
As opposed to the main prescription from these models, the possibility of self-fulﬁlling runs
does not necessarily justify a full bailout solution to ﬁnancial crisis. First, ‘catalytic ﬁnance’ is
more likely to work in the case of pure speculative crises: a partial bailout may well be suﬃcient
to restore conﬁdence. Second, and most important, crises are usually caused by a combination
of weak fundamentals, poor policies and speculative runs. Oﬃcial ﬁnance may create wrong
policy/eﬀort incentives deriving from expectations of a bailout.
The model presented in this paper contributes to take the policy debate a step further. Our
model sheds light on possible channels through which the IMF ‘catalytic ﬁnance’ may work,
i.e., channels through which the presence of contingent liquidity provision raises the number of
international investors willing to rollover their loans to a country for any given fundamental.
But this makes clear that catalytic ﬁnance cannot be eﬀective when the macroeconomic out-
look turns out to be very weak — as private signals become correspondingly worse, massive
withdrawal would cause a crisis whether or not the IMF intervenes.
28The equilibrium sketched above (and fully characterized by Dasgupta (1999) and CDMS), however, is not necessarily
unique.
36Second, our model emphasizes the possibility that liquidity assistance do not produce moral
hazard distortions. Rather, under some circumstances, it may turn out to be key for well-
intentioned governments to undertake appropriate policies, as the IMF could at least in part
shield the country from self-fulﬁlling speculative runs. In other words, by insuring against
liquidation costs caused by self-fulﬁlling speculation, the IMF could raise the expected gains
from reforms, therefore making them more attractive relative to their costs. Other papers based
on global games has provided examples of this principle, notably Morris and Shin (2002).
While pointing to this possibility, this literature makes clear that moral hazard distortions
are likely to be the dominant concern in setting up facilities providing international liquidity
support. As is well known, there are moral hazard distortions at diﬀerent levels (i.e., at the level
of the debtor country — its private and public sector — as well as of international investors).
The reform of the international ﬁnancial architecture cannot but address the issue of their
involvement in bearing the cost of a crisis — vis-a-vis the provision of liquidity as an insurance
against speculation risk.
This paper and Morris and Shin (2002) show that the literature on global games is particu-
larly eﬀective to shed light on these issues. Morris and Shin reach conclusions similar to ours in
a stylized one-period model, we articulate them in a bank-run framework. Moreover, we model
explicitly the payoﬀs of the IMF and domestic policy makers, showing how the equilibrium al-
location depends on the incentive structure faced by the main players (private and public). We
show how our approach can account for a number of realistic features of the international ﬁnan-
cial architecture — in some cases requiring the speciﬁcation of a more articulated framework.
It is reasonable to expect that this literature will soon have further important developments
as regards both theory and policy analysis.
In the text of our paper, we have already pointed out important directions for future research
building on the framework of our model. These include a study of the optimal size of liquidity
support, the implications of a preferred creditor status for the IMF, and the optimal timing and
conditionality of IMF interventions. We have argued that the analysis of these issues crucially
depends on the speciﬁcation of payoﬀs for both the IMF and the international investors —
which is a natural important development of our model.
But there are many other dimensions that future research could explore. For instance,
the true type of government (conservative, reformist, radical and so on) is likely to be only
37imperfectly observed. We have seen that, depending on the parameters of the model, liquidity
may either complement reforms and good policies, or induce moral hazard distortions. As the
preferences of the government may well be relevant in determining which scenario is faced by
the IMF, allowing for imperfectly credible policymakers will crucially inﬂuence the optimal
timing, size and conditionality of IMF interventions and the success of catalytic approach —
that could be reconsidered in the context of model with pooling/separating equilibria. In
this respect, empirical studies (reviewed by Cottarelli and Giannini (2002)) suggest that the
catalytic approach tends to fail when adjustment policies are imperfectly credible.
The structure of our economy is highly stylized — in the tradition of bank run studies and
many recent contributions on international illiquidity and vulnerability to crises. There could
be important lessons to be learned from model in which the public and the private sectors are
treated separately, specifying both a banking and a nonﬁnancial corporate sector. By the same
token, we focused on a real model, abstracting from the link between ﬁnancial and currency
crises. Extending the model as to analyze this link could contribute to our understanding of
dollarization.
By the same token, we mostly focused on bailouts. The literature suggests that, when
large bailout funds are not available, coercive bailins in the form of debt standstill and sus-
pensions may work at times. Under which conditions, bailins and debt suspensions dominate
catalytic solutions? Moreover, most of the recent debate on architecture reform has centered
on comparing alternative debt restructuring mechanisms. This is the policy debate contrasting
a “statutory approach” (SDRM) to a “contractual approach” (collective action clauses) to debt
restructuring. Our analytical apparatus can be modiﬁed to address such issues — Haldane et
al. (2002) provide an example of work in this direction.
There is great need for comprehensive empirical studies of catalytic ﬁnance, to which our
paper can provide a suitable theoretical framework. Looking at the policy experience in the last
decade, the catalytic approach was initially adopted by the IMF in each of the main emerging
market economies that experienced a crisis (Mexico, Thailand, Indonesia, Korea, Russia, Brazil,
Turkey, Argentina to name the most important ones — see Cottarelli and Giannini (2002)).
The approach succeeded in some cases (Mexico, Brazil); it did not succeed in others (Russia,
Argentina, Indonesia). The 1997/98 crisis in Korea is an example of partial success. Catalytic
ﬁnance cum policy adjustment was not enough to ensure voluntary market debt rollover; the
38collective action problem of creditors was however solved by a semi-coercive bailin (with the
coercive restructuring of short-term cross-border interbank lines). Empirical studies of why and
to what extent catalytic ﬁnance may work has great importance to guide the current policy
debate on the reform of international ﬁnancial architecture, whereas exceptional IMF ﬁnance
is perhaps the hottest issue at stake.
A Appendix
A.1 Multiple equilibrium benchmark
The coordination eﬀect that is captured by global-game models cannot be accounted for by
models of international lender of last resort after Diamond and Dybvig [1983]. This framework
assumes common knowledge of the signal, and in equilibrium each agent conditions his choice
on the speculative position taken by all other agents in the economy. Because of this strong
assumption, multiple equilibria are possible for intermediate range of fundamentals, whereas a
country defaults if a speculative run occurs, is solvent otherwise. In this range, a debt crisis
occurs when each fund manager believes (i.e., knows) that all other fund managers will also
refuse to roll over their debt. There is no heterogeneity in managers’ action: either everybody
attacks (i.e., x = 1), or nobody attacks (i.e., x = 0). In this appendix we study a version of
our model without private information — in the tradition of the bank-run literature stressing
multiple equilibria and self-fulﬁlling runs. Without private information, IMF interventions
of limited size can lower, at the margin, the break-even rate of return conditional on the
whole market denying credit (i.e., x = 1), but not the break-even rate conditional on nobody
withdrawing their funds (x = 0). Most important, they are irrelevant in determining whether
the market rollover or withdraw loans (i.e., whether x = 0 or x = 1) — see the analysis in
Corsetti Pesenti and Roubini (2002) — unless the IMF has enough resources to bailout the
country completely.
Assume that in our model all investors and the IMF have complete information about R.
We are interested in understanding the main features of this economy, and identify the values
of the fundamental R corresponding to which the equilibrium is not unique. The equilibrium is
characterized by the following partition of R. Suppose that L is small relative to the external
39ﬁnancing gap of the country. If R < Rs, the country is insolvent and there is a unique
equilibrium with x = 1 and a crisis. If R > Max
£
Rs, Rs(1 + ·) ¡ ·L
I
¤
the country has enough
liquidity to pay everybody and there is a unique equilibrium with x = 0 and no crisis. If
Rs < R < Rs(1 + ·) ¡ ·L
I , there are 2 equilibria, depending on whether investors attack the
country or keep lending to it. Note that, when the IMF has suﬃciently large resources relative
to the next stock of short-term liability of the country, the equilibrium is unique: a crisis occurs
if and only if R < Rs.
To see this, consider ﬁrst an equilibrium with a crisis. In equilibrium, rational investors
will all withdraw in the ﬁrst period (x = 1) and the IMF does not intervene. It is easy to
see that, in equilibrium, no investor will have an incentive to deviate and lend to the country.
In our speciﬁcation, a single investor of inﬁnitesimal size makes no diﬀerence in the amount
of resources that the country will have in period 2. So, an individual agent have an incentive
to deviate if and only if R is suﬃciently high that the country will be left with non-negative
resources in the second period, independently of the run. But if the R is large enough, a crisis
cannot be an equilibrium outcome, and nobody attacks.
Things are slightly diﬀerent for the IMF, as this agent is not inﬁnitesimal, i.e., its interven-
tion makes a diﬀerence as regards the end-point resources of the country. Namely, the IMF has
an incentive to deviate if the country has non-negative resources in the second period condi-
tional on its intervention. If all agents withdraw (x = 1) and the IMF intervenes, equation (12)
tells us that the country will have non-negative resources in the second period if R > ¯ Rx=1,
where ¯ Rx=1 is given by:
¯ Rx=1I ¡ (1 + ·)[D ¡ M ¡ L]+ = L
Now there are two cases to consider, depending on the size of the IMF. If L < D ¡ M, which
means that the IMF endowment of liquidity in not large enough to ﬁll the whole external
ﬁnancing gap, we have:
¯ Rx=1 = Rs(1 + ·) ¡ ·
L
I
Conversely, if L > D ¡ M, the IMF can solve the liquidity problem by itself, and we have
¯ Rx=1 = Rs
Note that ¯ Rx=1 depends on L. If L is limited, the IMF can contain the costs of a speculative
40run over some range of fundamentals. If L is not limited, instead, liquidity is not an issue, and
a crisis only occurs if the country is insolvent.
Consider now a scenario without a crisis: rational agents do not withdraw (x = 0) and the
IMF intervenes. An equilibrium without crisis is consistent with rational expectations if the
return on investment plus the money from the IMF is enough to pay all creditors and the IMF
in the second period — in other words, there are no liquidation costs. Nobody has an incentive
to deviate if R > ¯ Rx=0, which is given by:
I ¯ Rx=0 + L = D ¡ M + L
which yields:
¯ Rx=0 = Rs
As there are no early withdrawals, the IMF is not saving any liquidation cost, so the equilibrium
with no crisis exists if and only if the country is solvent. Note that ¯ Rx=0 does not depend on
L.
So, according to the multiple-equilibria framework, the IMF can solve the liquidity problem
if and only if it has deep pockets. Otherwise, it has a limited impact on the range of funda-
mentals for which multiple equilibria are possible. Observe that, in equilibrium, either (a) all
investors withdraw, the IMF does not intervene and there is a crisis, or (b) all investors roll
over their debts, the IMF intervenes and there is no crisis.
In this model, there is no endogenous mechanism of equilibrium selection. Which equilib-
rium will investors choose? The solution usually adopted by the literature consists in attributing
arbitrary probabilities » to a sunspot event selecting between equilibria. Note that this solu-
tion has many well-known conceptual problems: why would everybody pick the same action?
what is the sunspot? But even abstracting from these particular issues, consider the goal of
analyzing catalytic ﬁnance and moral hazard distortion within the framework sketched above.
The sunspot probabilities » must be known ex-ante. The equilibrium would depend crucially
on », but not on preference parameters b, c, B, C. Conditional on », the IMF will have an
eﬀect only on the threshold ¯ Rx=1, but not on the other thresholds. It will play no role in the
equilibrium selection (unless this role is posited by assumption). All the above problems are
avoided in our formulation.
41A.2 Uniqueness and existence of equilibrium




= G( ¯ RL ¡ s¤) +
Z ¯ R
¯ RL
g(R ¡ s¤) ¢ H(s¤ ¡ R)dR
We want to show that there is a unique value that solves this equation. Deﬁne w = R ¡ s¤,
¯ w = ¯ R ¡ s¤, and ¯ wL = ¯ RL ¡ s¤ (where clearly ¯ w > ¯ wL). Changing variables in equation (19)
and using (17) we get:














Key to our proof is that the RHS of this equation is monotonically increasing in ¯ w and ¯ wL ,
and both ¯ w and ¯ wL in turn are monotonically increasing in s¤. To see why, note that increasing
¯ wL is equivalent .... As regards ¯ wL, substituting (16) in the deﬁnition of this variable we can
write
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just as in CDMS. Thus, for suﬃciently large s¤ the LHS of (35) is positive, while it is negative
for suﬃciently small s¤. Since the LHS is continuous in s¤, there is a unique solution to (35).
Once s¤ is uniquely determined, S¤ follows from (17).
A.3 Proof of proposition 1
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Note that ³1;³2 2 (0;1).
Now, deﬁne w = R ¡ s¤, ¯ w = ¯ R ¡ s¤, and ¯ wL = ¯ RL ¡ s¤. Using (36) and (37) we have:
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Changing variables in equation (19) and using (17) we get:
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which completes the proof.
43A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Let Φ be the standard normal distribution. Then, equation (17) can be written as:
Φ
³p





Diﬀerentiating with respect to the precision of IMF information (¯), we get:
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S ¡ w) ( ¯ wL ¡ w) dw
2
p
¯ + ½[(1 ¡ ³1)³3 + (1 ¡ ³2)³5]
< 0
where















¯ + ½ dw > 0










which concludes our proof.
44A.5 Proof of Proposition 3





















³3(1 ¡ ³1) + ³4(1 ¡ ³2)
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A.6 Proof of Proposition 5
Equations (15) and (16) are identical to equations (29) and (30). A bit of algebra shows that
(check the proof for the derivatives with respect to L):
s0¤ ¸ s¤ ) ( ¯ R0
L ¡ s0¤) · ( ¯ RL ¡ s¤) and ( ¯ R0 ¡ s0¤) · ( ¯ R ¡ s¤) (46)
Moreover,
s0¤ < s¤ , ¯ R0 < ¯ R , ¯ R0
L < ¯ RL
Now, suppose that s0¤ ¸ s¤.
From equations (33) and (19), we have that:
45G( ¯ RL ¡ s¤) +
Z ¯ R
¯ RL


















Using relations (34) and (46), we get a contradiction that proves our claim.
A.7 Liquidity provision with no ‘limited liability’
Assume that the government cares about GDP — and that there are additional resources in
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[R ¢ I + M ¡ D] f (R j RN) dR
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[R ¢ I + M ¡ D] [f (R j RA) ¡ f (R j RN)] dR ¡ Ψ








¡ ¯ RL j RN
¢
¡ f
¡ ¯ RL j RA
¢¤
Therefore, the sign of the marginal eﬀect of L in this case is the same as in equation (23).
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